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ANOTHER FACTOR IN THE
"DECISIONAL CALCULUS":




Do you remember when drug commercials would not reveal exactly what
the drugs were supposed to do? Those commercials depicted "wind-surfer[s]
gliding over fields of wheat" or a group of swimmers at the beach.1 But if you
have paid attention, you have noticed drug commercials today are more
specific, and there are many more of them.2
Now imagine you suffer from one of the many ailments for which these
drugs are advertised, and you see one of these commercials. You become
convinced that the drug is right for you. The advertisement ends, among a
quick list of some of the drug's contraindications, with a message to consult
your doctor.3 You visit your doctor and ask her for the drug. After the doctor
warns you about all the side effects and dangers of the drug, you still insist and
receive a prescription. After taking the drug, you suffer a severe side effect and
are injured. According to the learned intermediary doctrine, the pharmaceutical
manufacturer only had a duty to warn the prescribing physician, who then had
a duty to take that warning into her treatment considerations and pass it on to
the patient.' Is that fair? The drug was marketed directly to you. You do not
remember seeing a warning on the commercial or on the drug's package about
the side effect you suffered, and you believe you should have recourse against
the party who made the drug and marketed it to you. Why should the
pharmaceutical manufacturer be insulated from liability when the drug was
marketed directly to you?
The learned intermediary doctrine is a well-established exception to the
duty to warn.' However, due to changes in the way the Food and Drug
1. Andrew Somora, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Are Consumers Being Informed?,
8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 205, 205 (1998-99).
2. See William E. Holtz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising: Effects on
Public Health, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 200 (1998-99) ("Over the past two decades, and to a
greater extent recently, society has been increasingly exposed to prescription drug
advertisements aimed directly at the consumer.").
3. See Somora, supra note 1, at 205.
4. See Brooks v. Medtronic Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating South
Carolina law regarding the learned intermediary rule).
5. See Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging the
Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 931, 936 (1993)
(stating that the learned intermediary doctrine was "originally conceived" in a 1948 New York
1
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Administration (FDA) regulates the industry, the marketing of prescription
pharmaceuticals directly to consumers through broadcast media is a fairly
recent development." This new development has led to a debate over whether
the learned intermediary doctrine should, in these situations, remain an
exception to the manufacturer's duty to directly warn the consumer.! The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability only briefly addresses this
issue and states that the issue is to be decided by "developing case law."8
This Comment explores both sides of this debate. Part II examines the
FDA regulations, both past and present, regarding the advertising of
prescription drugs directly to consumers. Part m examines the learned
intermediary doctrine and discusses judicial exceptions which state that a
pharmaceutical manufacturerhas a duty to warn the prescription consumer and
not just the medical care provider. Part IV of this Comment analyzes the
current law regarding the learned intermediary doctrine, examines the
physician-patient relationship and its effect on the doctrine, and weighs the
benefits and drawbacks of direct-to-consumer (DTC) drug advertisements. This
Comment concludes that the learned intermediary doctrine should remain in
place even as pharmaceutical manufacturers increase their use of DTC drug
advertisements.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DTC PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISEMENT
REGULATION
A. Regulation ofPrescription Drug Advertisement Before 1997
The FDA regulates the promotion of pharmaceutical products.9 Under 21
U.S.C. § 352, the regulations extend to "all advertisements" which naturally
includes print and broadcast advertisements.'0 The FDA has been regulating the
case).
6. See Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-ConsumerPrescription DrugAdvertising, 25 AM. J.L.
& MED. 149, 150 (1999) ("On August 8, 1997, the FDA changed how it regulates DTC
advertising by promulgating a new guidance, Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed
Broadcast Advertisements . . . that clarifies existing prescription drug advertisement
requirements for broadcast media.").
7. See Somora, supra note 1, at 206 (suggesting that, because pharmaceutical
manufacturers have new freedom in direct-to-consumer advertising, they should not be shielded
from liability behind the learned intermediary doctrine); see also Michael C. Allen, Comment,
Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation of the Effect of Direct-to-Consumer
PharmaceuticalAdvertising on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 20 CAMPBELL L. RsV. 113,
125-129 (1997) (arguing that the benefits of direct-to-consumer advertising by the
pharmaceutical industry outweigh the drawbacks).
8. RESTATEMENT (TH RD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILrTY § 6 cmt. e (1998).
9. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988) (giving to the FDA the power to regulate the advertising
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advertising of prescription drugs since 1963." Initially, those regulations only
addressed marketing and advertising directed towards the medical care
provider." When pharmaceutical manufacturers first began to float the idea of
marketing their products directly to the consumers, the FDA had placed a
moratorium on DTC advertising but had lifted it by 1985."3 The Upjohn
Company became the first to advertise its drugs directly to consumers when it
advertised the hair-loss treatment Rogaine. 4
Initially, any advertisement of a prescription drug was required to include
all adverse information about the drug, its side effects and contraindications.1
5
This requirement naturally led to confrontations between the pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the FDA.' 6 Much of the debate centered around exactly
what sort of information was necessary to satisfy the regulations, although there
were some challenges to the scope of the FDA's authority over the regulation
of pharmaceuticals.7
In 1988 a "more workable format" was introduced that required all
prescription drug advertisements to include: "'1) a true statement of the
established name for the drug and its formula; and 2) a brief summary of
information about the drug relating to its side effects, contraindications for its
use, and its effectiveness.""... This regulation was known as the "brief
summary" requirement." The FDA further provided a special exception to this
brief summary requirement.' Instead of requiring the advertisement to contain
the brief summary of the drug's side effects, contraindications for its use, and
its effectiveness, which actually was anything but "brief," the advertisement
could omit the lengthy summary but would not be permitted to give the drug's
indications at all.2' Almost all manufacturers chose the advertisements that did
not give the drug's indications' because including a long list of all the drug's
adverse effects during a commercial simply was not "feasible."'
11. See Somora, supra note 1, at 206.
12. See Perez v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1258 (N.J. 1999).
13. See id.
14. See id. at 1251.
15. See Somora supra note 1, at 206.
16. See id.
17. See id. For an interesting discussion about the scope and nature of the FDA's authority
to regulate statements about prescription drug products and whether they have overstepped their
authority, as well as the implications on the First Amendment, see Charles J. Walsh & Alissa
Pyrich, FDA Efforts to Control the Flow ofInformation at Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored
Medical Education Programs: A Regulatory Overdose, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1325 (1994).
18. Somara, supra note 1, at 206 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988)).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(1)-(3)(iii) (2000) (requiring that the
brief summary disclose all the information relating to the drug's adverse effects in the drug's
approved package labeling).
20. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 149.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See PHRMA, FAcTs AND FIGuREs: DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING, at
http://www.phrma.org/facts/bkgmdr/advert.hurnl (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
2001]
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B. The Changing Health Care System
The limitations on advertising for prescription drugs must be considered
in light of the fact that pharmaceutical manufacturing is a business. Health care
represents fourteen percent of the gross domestic product and is the "largest
single area of non-government spending."' The health care industry has
experienced a major change in the way Americans pay for their health care.2
Since the end of World War II, more and more Americans have relied on third-
party health care providers.26 Rising health care costs led to a "health care
inflation rate" (annual percentage increase in health-benefit costs) that peaked
in the late 1980s at nineteen percent.27 These developments have changed the
"delivery of health care services" and resulted in the concept of "managed
care."' Minimizing costs while still attempting to optimize service in the
delivery of health care has come to the forefront in the health care industry.29
With these changes, pharmaceutical manufacturers now find it necessary to
compete to "position their products in the chain of delivery."3 One logical
result was that pharmaceutical manufacturers began to market their products
in new ways, such as creating alliances with insurers and health maintenance
organizations.31 However, the DTC advertisements have become "[a]mong the
most controversial." '
24. Allen, supra note 7, at 113 (citation omitted).
25. See id. at 114. See generally Julie Rovner, United States ofAmerica: The Healthcare
System Evolves, 348 THELANcET 1001, 1001 (1996) (discussing the current state of health care
in the United States).
26. See Rovner, supra note 25, at 1001. The author makes the interesting point that
employer-
provided insurance is "a quirk of history" that "began during World War H when companies
were prohibited from raising wages to attract workers from a pool shrunken by the armed forces.
Instead, companies began offering fringe benefits, and hospitalisation insurance became a
popular job perk." Id.
27. See Allen, supra note 7, at 114.
28. Id.; see also THE AMERICAN HERrAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 822 (3d. ed. 2000)
(defining "Managed care" as "[a]n arrangement for health care in which an organization, such
as an HMO or an insurance company, acts as an intermediate between the person seeking care
and the physician").
29. See Allen, supra note 7, at 114.
30. Id.
3 1. See id. at 114; see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17 (discussing the pharmaceutical
industry's efforts, through educational seminars, to market drugs and the FDA's increased
scrutiny of these seminars).
32. Allen, supra note 7, at 115.
4
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C. The FDA 's New "Guidance"
In August 1997 the FDA changed the way pharmaceutical manufacturers
were able to advertise their product directly to the consumer.33 Recognizing the
confusion surrounding what information in an advertisement would satisfy the
regulations, the new Guidance merely clarified the FDA's stance on the
regulation of DTC drug advertisements. 4 The Guidance no longer required a
pharmaceutical manufacturer to include the "brief summary. 35 The DTC drug
advertisement now only requires a major statement "in either the audio or audio
and visual parts of the presentation. Instead of presenting a 'brief summary ' in
connection with the broadcast advertisement, a sponsor may make adequate
provision for the dissemination of the approved package labeling in connection
with the broadcast presentation."36 This "adequate provision" requirement has
been understood to require the "major statement"of the DTC advertisement to
include information regarding the product's most important risks.
37
Pharmaceutical manufacturers must also provide more detailed information by
33. See Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer Directed Broadcast Advertisements;
Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 (proposed Aug. 12, 1997). The Guidance provides:
Section 502(n) (21 U.S.C. 352(n)) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (the act) requires that advertisements for prescription drugs... include
information inbriefsummary relating to side effects, contraindications, and
effectiveness. This is known as the "brief summary" requirement. The
prescription drug advertising regulations... further require that the brief
summary disclose all the risk-related information in a product's approved
package labeling (package insert or product package insert).
The regulations for advertising prescription drugs through broadcast
media, such as radio, television, or telephone communications systems,
however, modify the disclosure requirements somewhat. All prescription
drug broadcast advertisements must include information about the major
risks of the advertised drug (the "major statement") in either the audio or
audio and visual parts of the presentation. Instead of presenting a "brief
summary" in connection with the broadcast advertisement, a sponsor may
make adequate provision for the dissemination of the approved package
labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation .... This
alternative requirement is referred to as the "adequate provision"
requirement.
The "adequate provision" requirement recognizes the inability of
broadcast advertisements of reasonable length to present and communicate
effectively the extensive information that would be included in a brief
summary; it instead specifies that presentation of the advertised product's
most important risk information as part of the "major statement," together
with "adequate provision" for the dissemination of the approved labeling,
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a toll-free number, Internet site, or other literature.38 An important point about
the FDA's Guidance is that, currently, the FDA does not require
pharmaceutical manufacturers to send the commercials to the FDA for pre-
release screening.39 The FDA only reviews the commercials after they have
been released. 4
DTC drug advertisements have increased substantially every year since the
release of the new Guidance.4' It has been estimated that in 1998,
pharmaceutical manufacturers spent $1.4 billion on DTC drug advertisements.42
It is estimated that in the next year, from January 1998 to January 1999, the
yearly total climbed to $1.9 billion.43 Television commercials, reported to be
the fastest growing "medium for advertising," comprised $1.1 billion of the
$1.9 billion spent in 1999 on pharmaceutical advertisements."
M. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
A. The Duty to Warn
For a manufacturer, liability for failure to warn has generally been based
on negligence or strict liability.45 Instructions and warnings provide a consumer
the opportunity to minimize risks through proper use of a product and to make
an informed decision regarding whether to even encounter the risks associated
with the product.4 Instructions and warnings with pharmaceutical products will
almost always impact whether the consumer chooses to take the drug and thus
encounter the associated risks.47 Nearly all jurisdictions do not impose strict
liability on a pharmaceutical manufacturer, largely because it is difficult to
38. See Allen, supra note 7, at 115; see also Susan Okie, With TVSpots, Drug Firms Aim
at Patients'Role: Strategy forPrescription Shifts Away from Doctors, WASH. POST, May 22,
2000, at Al ("The new guidance allowed TV and radio ads to mention only major risks and to
list four sources-'your doctor,' a toll-free number, a Web site and a concurrent print ad-for
people who wanted additional information.").
39. See Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer Directed Broadcast Advertisements;
Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171, at 43,172-43,173; see also Okie, supra note 38, at Al
(reporting that drug companies "must send a copy to the FDA whenever a new TV ad (or any
other prescription drug ad) debuts" and quoting chief of the division of drug advertising at the
FDA who said her "staff of 15 reviewers was responsible for screening about 30,000 pieces of
promotional material last year, including more than 100 television commercials").
40. See Okie, supra note 38, at Al.
41. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 151 ("Drug companies spent $595.5 million on DTC
advertisements in 1996, a ninety percent increase from 1995. This figure exceeded $1 billion in
1997." (footnotes omitted));see also Okiesupra note38, atAl ("Direct-to-consumer advertising
for prescription medicines increased nearly 20-fold during the 1990s.").
42. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 151.
43. See Okie, supra note 38, at Al.
44. Id.
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balance the dangers with the benefits of a pharmaceutical product.' Therefore,
the liability of a pharmaceutical manufacturer is generally determined
according to negligence principles and focuses on (1) who should receive the
warning and (2) whether the warning was adequate.49 This Comment will focus
on who should receive the warning and its effect on the learned intermediary
doctrine. The adequacy of a warning is beyond the scope of this Comment and
will not be addressed.
B. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine-An Exception to the Duty to
Warn
The idea that a prescription drug manufacturer only has a duty to warn the
treating medical care provider, thus creating an exception to the duty to warn,
can be traced as far back as the 1948 New York decision of Marcus v. Specific
Pharmaceuticals, Inc." In Marcus Judge Steuer set the foundation for what
would later be called the learned intermediary doctrine:
The sole claim is not misrepresentation or even concealment,
but a negligent failure to give adequate information, and in
some instances a failure to use adequate means to call
attention to the information given. It may be safely conceded
that these allegations would be sufficient if the product were
sold to the public generally as a drug for which no
physician's prescription was necessary. The situation alleged
is materially different. There is no reason to believe that a
physician would care to disregard his own knowledge of the
effects of drugs and hence of the quantity to be administered,
and substitute for his own judgment that of a drug
manufacturer. Nor is there any reason to expect that if a
doctor did choose to rely on the information given by the
manufacturer he would prescribe without knowing what that
48. See id. at 117-18; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
Comment k provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs.... The seller of such
products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and
marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability ... merely because he has undertaken to
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
49. See Allen, supra note 7, at 119.
50. 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1948).
TORT LAW2001]
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information was. In the absence of any such grounds for
belief there would be no negligence.5 '
The phrase "learned intermediary" was first used in Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish.2 Judge McManus, in his summary of the physician's relationship to
the patient and the pharmaceutical manufacturer, stated, "Moreover, inthis case
we are dealing with a prescription drug rather than a normal consumer item. In
such a case the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary between the
purchaser and the manufacturer."'
Today, the learned intermediary doctrine is well established in nearly all
jurisdictions, including South Carolina. 4 Under the learned intermediary
doctrine, if the treating medical care provider is adequately warned of the risks
associated with the drug, the manufacturer cannot be said to be the proximate
cause of any injuries that may arise from the patient's use of the drug.ss In
Odom the plaintiff argued that the court should presume causation if the
warning from the manufacturer was proven inadequate. 6 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to follow this logic and stated:
There is no such presumption under South Carolina law, and
we are unwilling to create one here. In Thomas, the Fifth
Circuit distinguished between preventable risk warnings,
which are commonly associated with mechanical products,
and unavoidable risk warnings, which are often associated
with prescription drugs or devices like the RID. In the former
category, a warning, if heeded, would diminish or eliminate
the risk. In the latter context, however, an adequate warning
"means only that the learned intermediary would have
incorporated the 'additional risk' into his decisional calculus.
The burden remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
additional non-disclosed risk was sufficiently high that it
51. Id. at509-510.
52. 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. See Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he
manufacturer's duty to warn extends only to the prescribing physician, who then assumes
responsibility for advising the individual patient of risks associated with the drug or device.");
Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the South
Carolina Supreme Court would adopt the learned intermediary doctrine); see also Amore v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 845, 850 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (applying Florida law); Desmarais v. Dow
Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D. Conn. 1989) (applying Connecticut law); Chambers v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377,381 (D. Md. 1975) (applying Maryland law).
55. See Odom, 979 F.2d at 1003.
56. Id.
1000 [Vol. 52: 993
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would have changed the treating physician's decision to
prescribe the product for the plaintiff."'
If the warnings to the treating medical care provider were not adequate, the
issue of the learned intermediary does not arise, although the manufacturer may
still avoid liability if causation is not shown. 8 It is important to note that the
burden is on the plaintiffto prove that the non-disclosed risk was so serious that
it would have changed the treating physician's decision to prescribe the drug
to the plaintiff.59 In other words, the plaintiff must show that the information
that the drug manufacturer knew, or should have known, was material to the
doctor's decision, and that if the doctor had been given the information, she
would not have prescribed the drug.' If the warning to the medical care
.provider was adequate, but the drug is prescribed without the warnings being
passed on to the patient, the failure by the medical care provider is viewed as
the "proximate cause" of the patient's injury."'
57. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Hoffinan-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806,814
(5th Cir. 1992)); see also Thomas, 949 F.2d 806, at 814 (applying Mississippi law) (holding
plaintiff, injured after ingesting drug, was not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of causation
after showing that the warnings provided to the physician by the manufacturer were inadequate).
Butsee Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77,81 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying Massachusetts law)
(holding thatplaintiffwas entitled to a rebuttable presumption that themanufacturer's inadequate
warnings were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries after the plaintiff was able to show
that the warnings were inadequate); Mampe v. Ayerst Lab., 548 A.2d 798, 801 (D.C. 1988). The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Mampe, quoting Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods.,
Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 725 (D.C. 1985), summarized the District of Columbia law regarding the
presumption due to a plaintiff:
To succeed in her claim against Ayerst, Mrs. Mampe must show that some
act or omission by Ayerst proximately caused her injuries. On the issue of
causation in inadequate labeling cases, case law in the District of Columbia
recognizes a rebuttable presumption "that the user"--in this case, the
prescribing physician--"would have read an adequate warning, and that in
the absence of evidence rebutting the presumption, ajury may find that the
defendant's product was the producing cause of the plaintiff's injury."
Mampe, 548 A.2d at 801.
58. See Brooks, 750 F.2d at 1231.
59. See Odom, 979 F.2d at 1003.
60. See id.
61. See Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 577 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). Affirming a
summary judgment for the defendant, the court held that the alleged negligent conduct of the
pharmaceutical manufacturer was not the proximate cause of the injury and stated:
The alleged negligence of the appellees was not the only force responsible
for Mrs. Dyer's injuries. The active conduct of a physician was necessary
in order for Mrs. Dyer to receive the injection of NOL-L.A. This act by the
physician included a consideration of the recommended uses of the drug,
the recommended forms of its administration, and whether any
contraindications of the drug's use were present. In this case, when Dr.
Stewart undertook these considerations, the efficiency of the appellees'
alleged negligent course of conduct ended, and only the risk of harm -
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C. Policy and Rationale Behind the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
In any analysis that questions whether the learned intermediary doctrine
should apply, it becomes critical to understand the policy and rationale behind
the learned intermediary rule. One basic policy is that pharmaceutical
manufacturers provide valuable products that improve the "quality and duration
of life."'62 This is not to say that pharmaceutical manufacturers should not owe
a duty of care to the general public and to the prescription*consumers in
particular. However, it is impossible to ignore the unique value that a
prescription drug possesses. In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals cited the decline in cases of polio as evidence of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer's value to society.' The courts have recognized
this value by creating a protective device that balances the need to hold a
manufacturer liable if that manufacturer fails to meet a duty of care with the
general policy of creating a system that will not discourage the production of
an overall useful product, even though, because of the drug's unique nature, the
product will almost assuredly cause injury to someone.65
A good example of the chilling effect on the pharmaceutical industry that
can occur if this policy is not recognized and reasonably protected is the crisis
that facilitated the passing of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act."
Between 1980 and 1986, the number of pharmaceutical manufacturers who
produced the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT) vaccine fell from eight to
two.67 This decline was the result of pharmaceutical manufacturers' fears of
62. See Allen, supra note 7, at 130.
63. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 1269-70. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Twenty or thirty years ago poliomyelitis was a dread disease that especially
attacked the very young. In 1952 alone, there were 57,879 reported cases
ofpolio in the United States; 21,269 of these resulted in crippling paralysis
to the victims. By 1970, when Anita Reyes contracted polio, the number of
those stricken by polio had diminished dramatically; she was one ofjust 33
individuals to be afflicted during that year. Credit for this precipitous
decline must go primarily to the medical researchers who discovered the
viral nature of the disease, and were able to isolate and reproduce the virus
in an inactivated or an attenuated form.... But credit for this remarkable
achievement must also be given to such laboratories as Wyeth, which
processed the polio vaccine, and to massive federal-state public health
programs for the administration of the vaccine.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
65. See REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §402Acmt. k (1965); see also In re Norplant
Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374,379 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Our understanding of the
rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine, at least in substantial part, is that it seeks to
encourage the drug manufacturer to make available prescription drugs despite their potentially
harmful side effects, by shielding the drug manufacturer from liability when the drug is
prescribed by a properly trained physician.").
66. See Allen, supra note 7, at 130-31.
67. Id.
1002 [Vol. 52: 993
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product liability." In 1986 Congress passed the National Vaccine Injury Act
which limited the available legal theories a plaintiff could pursue, required a
plaintiff to file any potential claim with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and set a statutory compensation award through a no-fault system.69
Despite the reasons for protecting the manufacturers, some courts have
suggested that the learned intermediary doctrine is necessary because warnings
directed to patients may interfere with the treatment of the patient.7 ' In Reyes
v. Wyeth Laboratories, the court stated:
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines,
esoteric in formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert,
the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of the
patient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any
medication against its potential dangers. The choice he makes
is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment
bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative."
This rationale recognizes that the physician is well-trained and is probably
in a better position to evaluate the patient's needs while at the same time taking
into account the patient's wishes.72 The physician is in abetter position to more
thoroughly and accurately convey any necessary warnings and will be able to
do so in a way the patient is better able to understand.73
Patient's potential confusion or fear regarding a drug's adverse effects is
another legitimate rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine.74 In McKee
v. American Home Products Corp. the Washington Supreme Court stated,
"Some have argued that direct warnings to the consumer, once the patient has
made the decision to use a drug and the physician is no longer available to
counsel, may be counterproductive and are contrary to the rationale behind the
learned intermediary doctrine. 75 Some scholars have theorized that a patient,
frightened or confused by warnings given to her, whether or not such warnings
68. Id.
69. Id. at 131.
70. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974).
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id.; see also Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[S]everal
arguments support[ ] the application of this exception to prescription drug products. First,
medical ethics and practice dictate that the doctor must be an intervening and independent party
between patient and drug manufacturer. Second, the [risk] information ... is often too technical
for a patient to make a reasonable choice.")
74. See Casey, supra note 5, at 948.
75. McKee v. Am. Home Prods., Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Wash. 1989) (citations
omitted).
2001] TORT LAW 1003
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are material to that patient's particular situation, may cause the patient to forego
treatment or conceal symptoms.
76
Commentators have also argued that meaningful communication between.
the everyday prescription consumer and the pharmaceutical manufacturer
would be best characterized as difficult.7 Notwithstanding the difficulties an
everyday prescription consumer would have in actually understanding any
warnings from the manufacturer, there also remains a problem of actually
getting the warning to the consumer.78 Most prescription drugs are not
disseminated in their original packaging."
Considering the important role pharmaceutical manufacturers play in
today's society along with the risks and difficulties of direct communication
between the manufacturer and the consumer, there is solid policy behind the
learned intermediary doctrine. This solid policy presents a formidable obstacle
for opponents of the learned intermediary doctrine, and any attempt to create
an exception warrants close scrutiny.
D. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Courts over the years have created several exceptions to the learned
intermediary rule and have thus imposed upon a pharmaceutical manufacturer
a duty to warn the prescription consumer directly.80 The Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Product Liability recognizes that courts have, at times, held that a
manufacturer owes such a duty to the prescription consumer.8' A fairly well-
recognized exception to the learned intermediary doctrine is the "mass
immunization" exception. This exception appears to be recognized by
sections 6(d) & (d)(2) of the Restatement (Third), which provides:
A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions
76. See Casey, supra note 5, at 948; see also Margaret Gilhooley, LearnedIntermediaries,
Prescription Drugs, and Patient Information, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 633, 642 (1986) (exploring
current policies behind the learned intermediary doctrine and its effect on a patient's right to
information).
77. See Casey, supra note 5, at 948.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Allen, supra note 7, at 122.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCT LIABILrrY § 6 (d)(2) (1998).
82. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121,131 (9th Cir. 1968) (applying Idaho law
and holding that although the vaccine was designated as a prescription drug, it was not
distributed as one, and the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply); Edwards v. Basel
Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 300-01 (Okla. 1997) (discussing the learned intermediary doctrine and
its exceptions, including the mass immunization exception); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1974) (finding that a manufacturerof a polo vaccine submitted
to the city for a mass immunization program owed a duty to warn and that the learned
intermediary doctrine did not apply).
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or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not
provided to ... the patient when the manufacturer knows or
has reason to know that the health-care providers will not be
in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with
the instructions or warnings.83
This exception "operate[s] to remove the manufacturer from behind the
shield of the learned intermediary doctrine."'" In a mass-immunization setting,
the pharmaceutical manufacturer owes a duty to warn the prescription
consumer of the drug's dangers so that the consumer will be adequately
informed.' The rationale behind this exception is that, in a mass immunization
setting, the patient does not receive "individualized" attention from the medical
care provider, and therefore, no professional calculation is made regarding what
is best for the patient in that particular situation. 6 In Edwards v. Basel
Pharmaceuticals the court described this "individualized attention" as follows:
Where a product is available only on prescription or through
the services of a physician, the physician acts as a 'learned
intermediary' between the manufacturer or seller and the
patient. It is his duty to inform himself of the qualities and
characteristics of those products which he prescribes for or
administers to or uses on his patients, and to exercise
independent judgment, taking into account his knowledge of
the patient as well as the product. The patient is expected to
and, it can be presumed, does place primary reliance upon
that judgment. The physician decides what facts should be
told to the patient. Thus, if the product is properly labeled and
carries the necessary instructions and warnings to fully
apprize the physician of the proper procedures for use and the
dangers involved, the manufacturer may reasonably assume
that the physician will exercise the informed judgment
thereby gained in conjunction with his own independent
learning, in the best interest of the patient.8"
The mass immunization exception is not the only time courts have held that
the learned intermediary doctrine should not shield a manufacturer from
liability." Courts have created other limited exceptions to this doctrine.8 9
83. REsTATEMENT(TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTLIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998).
84. Edwards, 933 P.2d at 301.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 300-01.
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A second exception occurs when the FDA mandates that warnings be
given directly to the ultimate consumer on certain prescription drugs (most
notably birth control pills) and medical devices." Courts, at times, have held
that the learned intermediary doctrine is inapplicable in these situations.9 A
discussion about whether the FDA's mandated requirements regarding
warnings on prescriptions pre-empts state tort law is beyond the scope of this
Comment. However, it is sufficient for this discussion to note that neither the
FDA's safety regulations nor the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act expressly or
impliedly pre-empt state civil tort actions in failure to warn cases.'
Further, courts generally view the FDA guidelines as a minimum
standard.' Courts have also held, where the warnings given to the consumer
complied with FDA guidelines, mere compliance with the FDA may still not
be sufficient to shield the pharmaceutical manufacturer from liability for a
failure to adequately warn the consumer.94 However, courts have not been
90. See id.
91. See id. at 301; see also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass.
1985) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the case of oral
contraceptives where the FDA has mandated warnings be given directly to the consumer).
92. See Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1500 (D. Kan. 1987). The district
court discussed the preemption issue and stated:
In order to find congressional intent to preempt state tort remedies, this
courtwould haveto conclude that the federal regulations werepromulgated
with the intent to exempt drug manufacturers from tort liability. This court
cannot find that such an intent is implicit in the regulatory scheme
governing the manufacture and distribution of DPT. To the contrary,
Congress has recently clarified its intent that regulations should not
preempt state tort remedies for victims of vaccine-related injuries. Such
intent was manifested in the "National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act".... Moreover, FDA regulations of prescription drugs are generally
viewed as setting minimum standards, both as to design and warning.
Id. at 1491 (citations omitted); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996)
(holding that the states have long possessed dominion over the right to protect the safety of their
citizens and that this state right is not preempted unless Congress clearly expresses the intent to
do so); Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989) ("FDA regulations are generally
minimal standards of conduct unless Congress intended to preempt common law, which
Congress has not done in this area."). But cf. Meyer v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 288, 293
(D.N.J. 1988) (holding that the Medical Device Act precludes a state tort action when FDA
requirements satisfied).
93. See Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 302 (Okla. 1997).
94. See id. In Edwards the plaintiff sued the pharmaceutical manufacturer of nicotine
patches for wrongful death after her husband suffered a fatal heart attack due to smoking
cigarettes while wearing two prescribed nicotine patches. Id. at 299.The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma concluded that the issue concerning the adequacy of a warning was not preempted by
the FDA requirements and noted that the duty to warn is still governed by state law. See id. at
303. The court concluded:
It is the widely held view that the FDA sets minimum standards for drug
manufacturers as to design and warnings. We conclude that compliance
with these minimum standards does not necessarily complete the
manufacturer's duty .... Even the FDA agrees, as noted by the FDA
Commissioner who observed that civil tort liability for failure to warn is
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consistent in their application of this rule, and some have held that satisfaction
of FDA requirements will satisfy the duty to warn the consumer." Regardless,
satisfaction of the FDA guidelines is, at the very least, an important factor in
considering whether the manufacturer satisfied its duty to warn. 96
This exception to the learned intermediary doctrine has been applied
primarily in cases dealing with intrauterine devices, nicotine patches, and
especially with contraceptives.' Additionally, one recent, state court case
governed by state law.
Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted). The court continued:
Although the common law duty we today recognize is to a large degree
coextensive with the regulatory duties imposed by the FDA, we are
persuaded that, in instances where a trier of fact could reasonably conclude
that a manufacturer's compliance with the FDA labeling requirements or
guidelines did not adequately apprise [prescription-drug] users of inherent
risks, the manufacturer should not be shielded from liability by such
compliance.
Id. at 302-03 (quoting MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985)).
95. See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374,379 (5th Cir. 1999);
Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Allen v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Or. 1989).
InIn re Norplant, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit criticized the Edwards decision:
The [Edwards] court reached this somewhat counter-intuitive result by
concluding that, where the potential side effects of a prescription drug are
so serious that the FDA places a requirement on the manufacturer to warn
the end user, the rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine no longer
applies.
At the outset, we find this conclusion to be puzzling. Our
understanding of the rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine, at least
in substantial part, is that it seeks to encourage the drug manufacturer to
make available prescription drugs despite their potentially harmful side
effects, by shielding the drug manufacturer from liability when the drug is
prescribed by a properly trained physician. Why the learned intermediary
doctrine should somehow be less applicable when the severity of the side
effects encourages the FDA to promote additional labeling escapes us.
In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 379; see also Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J.
1999) (holding that satisfaction of the FDA guidelines creates a presumption that the warnings
are adequate).
96. See Edwards, 933 P.2d at 302.
97. See Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the learned
intermediary doctrine did not apply for intrauterine-device case); Stephensv. G.D. Searle & Co.,
602 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (adopting language from the dissenting opinion inIn
re Certified Questions, Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 358 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1984) and
holding that the manufacturer of an oral contraceptive had a duty to warn the consumer despite
the learned intermediary); Lukascewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 532 F. Supp. 211,213 (E.D. Wis.
1981) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply to oral contraceptive
manufacturer in failure to warn case); Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (NJ.
1999) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply in a Norplant birth control
failure to warn case); Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997) (holding that
learned intermediary doctrine is not applicable in a wrongful death action arising from
prescription of nicotine-patches). But see In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability
Litigation, 165 F.3d 374, 380 (5th. Cir. 1999) (applying the learned intermediary doctrine in a
class-action case involving the manufacturer of the surgically implanted contraceptive,
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deserves particular mention among these "exception cases." In Perez v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc.,98 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the learned
intermediary doctrine should not apply when a drug is marketed directly to the
consumer through DTC advertising." However, Perez, a warning case
involving the contraceptive Norplant, ignored the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability
Litigation,e° which held that the learned intermediary doctrine should be
applied in failure to warn cases involving Norplant.10 In Perez the Supreme
Court of New Jersey stated that it preferred the reasoning in Edwards v. Basel
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., °2 which held that the learned intermediary doctrine did
not apply in a failure to warn case involving a prescription nicotine patch,'0 3
over the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in In re Norplant,' 4 even though the Fifth
Circuit specifically criticizedEdwards inIn reNorplant.'5 Although Perez has
not yet been rejected by any court, it has also not been relied on to hold the
learned intermediary doctrine inapplicable because ofDTC advertising. These
cases illuminate the inconsistencies among courts in finding exceptions to the
learned intermediary doctrine and demonstrate their resistance to dislodge this
well established doctrine. Furthermore, at least one court has called these birth
control, failure-to-warn, learned-intermediary-exception cases the "minority"
rule.1
6
Norplant); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding
that the learned intermediary doctrine applied because oral contraceptives were prescription
drugs and could only be obtained from a physician); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398,
401 (Del. 1989) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine applied in a failure to warn claim
involving intrauterine-devices); Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352,356 (111. 1996)
(holding that the learned intermediary doctrine relieves the manufacturer of the duty to warn the
consumer regarding oral contraceptive prescriptions); Freeman v. Hoffinan-LaRouche, Inc., 618
N.W.2d 827, 842 (Neb. 2000) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine would apply in a
failure to warn case regarding the drug Accutane); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 569
N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine relieved the
manufacturer of Nicorette tablets from a duty to warn).
98. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
99. Id. at 1247.
100. Id. at 1256.
101. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379-80 (5th. Cir.
1999).
102. 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997).
103. Seeid. at303.
104. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256.
105. See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 379.
106. Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356 (11. 1996).
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A. The Alteration of the Physician-Patient Relationship
The central theme, consistent among all of the cases finding an exception
to the learned intermediate doctrine, is that the physician-patient relationship
is not the same as in typical treatment scenarios. All of the cases that impose
a duty upon the pharmaceutical manufacturer to warn the consumer do so
relying in substantial part on some type of significant change in the physician-
patient relationship."° Comment b to § 6(b)(2) of the Restatement (Third)
recognizes this change in the physician-patient relationship exception by
providing, "[Iln certain limited therapeutic relationships the physician or other
health-care provider has a much-diminished role as an evaluator or
decisionmaker. In these instances it may be appropriate to impose on the
manufacturer the duty to warn the patient directly."'08
The most obvious change in this relationship is viewed in the mass-
immunization setting. In these settings very little to no physician-patient
relationship exists.' ° The individualized medical judgment, the cornerstone of
the learned intermediary doctrine,110 is glaringly absent in situations where the
drug is administered to a large group of patients with only a single physician,
or even only a nurse, acting more as an overseer of the process and less like a
physician who examines and makes an individualized judgment about each
patient."'
The issue is not as clear in the non-mass-immunization setting because the
patient actually does meet with a doctor. However, the substantial lack of a
physician-patient relationship is still reasonably evident.
In Hill v. Searle Laboratories' 2 the court noted several factors that indicate
a change in the physician-patient relationship.'"' First, the court pointed out that
the decision to take the prescription, an intrauterine device (IUD) in this case,
was almost entirely the patient's to make and not the physician's." 4 The court
also noted that the patient had no contact with the physician after the
prescription had been given, the product was marketed directly to the
107. See Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 878 (E.D. Mich.1985);
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILrrY § 6 cmt. b (1998) (citation
omitted).
109. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription DrugAdvertising and
the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. L 829, 832 (1991).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b.
I 11. See Allen, supra note 7, at 122.
112. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 1070-71.
114. Id.
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consumer, and that the FDA required the warnings be given directly to the
consumer."1
5
InMacDonaldv. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp."' the only state court case
currently known to hold that the learned intermediary doctrine did not shield
the manufacturer of an oral contraceptive from the duty to warn the consumer,
the court noted that the physician's role was reduced to a "passive" one
regarding the patient's choice to begin using "the Pill.""..7 Similar to Hill, the
court's decision in MacDonald to not apply the learned intermediary doctrine
centered on the following factors: (1) the minimal amount of input necessary
from the physician in the patient's decision to actually take the prescription (an
oral contraceptive in this case); (2) the physician only examines the patient
once before prescribing the contraceptive; (3) the physician will only examine
the patient on an annual basis after the prescription has been given; and (4) the
extensive regulations imposed on the oral contraceptive manufacturer by the
FDA."' This change in the physician-patient relationship is conspicuous in all
of the cases that find the learned intermediary doctrine inapplicable." 9
In these cases the courts have also mentioned the distinction between a
therapeutic drug and a non-therapeutic drug.'20 A therapeutic drug is a drug
"[h]aving or exhibiting healing powers."'' Obviously many of the
prescriptions, the contraceptives for instance, that have been the center of
controversy in the cases that have held the learned intermediary doctrine
inapplicable, fall on the side ofnon-therapeutic.' The decisional calculus that
is so essential to the rationale behind the learned intermediary doctrine is much
more evident when the patient visits the physician for therapeutic reasons, such
as treatment of an illness, as opposed to non-therapeutic reasons, such as to
receive "the Pill.'"" When prescribing a non-therapeutic drug, the physician
may be transformed from an advisor to a "supporting role."'24 Essentially, the
decision is almost entirely the patient's, not the physician's.
It is important to keep in mind that these exception cases are by no means
the settled law.'" Almost all of those cases that have held the learned
intermediary doctrine to be inapplicable have been highly criticized by other
115. Id.
116. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
117. Id. at 69.
118. Id.
119. Id; see also Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379,381 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(noting that the patient sought and received the prescription contraceptive with little input from
the prescribing physician); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867,874-75 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (noting that patients who receive prescriptions for oral contraceptives play a much
different role than in traditional prescription settings).
120. See Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 380-8 1; Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 874-75.
121. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1406 (3d ed. 2000).
122. See id.
123. See Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 380-8 1.
124. Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 875.
125. See Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352,356 (Ill. 1996).
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courts 12 At least one court has called these exception cases the "minority"
rule." MacDonald is the only state court case currently known to have held
that the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply to a failure to warn case
regarding oral contraceptives. 28 The learned intermediary doctrine is a well-
established doctrine and any exception to this doctrine is narrowly construed.'"
B. DTCAdvertisements and the Physician-PatientRelationship: Is there
Enough Change to Warrant an Exception to the Learned Intermediary
Rule?
After understanding why the courts, although not consistently, have held
the learned intermediary doctrine inapplicable in some cases, the issue of the
learned intermediary doctrine and DTC pharmaceutical advertising arises. The
question still remains: since manufacturers are now able to market their
product directly to the consumer, 3 ' should the courts create another exception
to the learned intermediary doctrine and hold drug manufacturers who advertise
their products through DTC advertisements liable for a failure to warn the
prescription consumer? Based on the rationale applied in the cases discussed
earlier, the answer appears to depend on whether the physician-patient
relationship is substantially changed by these advertisements.'
Critics of DTC advertising who propose that such advertising warrants an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine suggest that the physician-
patient relationship is altered by DTC advertising.' As one doctor stated, "I
have seen an increase in patients coming into this office and requesting a
specific brand of drug that they saw on television."'3 One reported study
showed that DTC advertising can lead to the physician having to spend more
time with the patient reviewing the pros and cons of the requested drug and
explaining formulary restrictions when the requested drug is outside the health
126. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988)
(disagreeing with Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp. and Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co.); Humes v.
Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1040-41 (Kan. 1990) (declining to follow Lukaszwicz v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D.Wis. 1981)); see also Schwartz, supra note 109, at 834 ("With the
few exceptions noted above, courts have chosen not to abandon the learned intermediary rule in
prescription drug cases.")
127. See Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356 (111. 1996).
128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
129. See Schwartz, supra note 109, at 831.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 107-29.
132. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 157; see also Patient Requests for Brand Name Rx on
Rise, 21 CHAIN DRUG REV., Jan. 18,1999, at Rx7 ("Two new studies by IMS Health find that half
of United States-based physicians and managed care organizations report a significant increase
in the number of consumers requesting prescription drugs by brand name .... ).
133. Interview with Kevin Griggs, M.D., Family Physician at Lexington Family Practice,
in Columbia, S.C. (Sept. 14,2000).
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plan's formulary.' 3 Another survey of 5,000 patients and 5,000 physicians
found that almost 75% of the doctors discussed, in one way or another, the
contents of a DTC advertisement and almost 90% of the 5,000 patients had
asked for the drug by its brand name. 3
Undeniably, DTC drug advertising has led to an increase in patients asking
their doctors for a particular drug by name. Thus there has been some type of
change in the physician-patient relationship. The question remains: Do DTC
advertisements alter the physician-patient relationship enough to warrant an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine? More importantly, has the
relationship been "diminished"?' a6
Managed care has put a strain on the amount of time a physician can spend
with a patient.3 7 A reality of managed care programs is that the physician
spends less time with the patient.' Commentators argue that the "overall
health ofapatient may be compromised" when the physician has to spend more
time with a patient answering questions about a drug the patient saw on
television and less time actively examining and treating the patient.'39
Commentators have also suggested that physicians may prescribe a drug
to a patient even when the physician does not feel that particular drug is in the
patient's best interest."4 One survey found that one-half of the physicians
surveyed feel pressured to prescribe a prescription to the patient when the
patient asks for a particular prescription."'
Courts have not shown a particular deference towards this line of thinking.
In Incollingo v. Ewing42 the physician claimed he was pressured by "detail
men" (better characterized as sales representatives) from the pharmaceutical
manufacturer to prescribe a drug that he otherwise would not have
prescribed.'43 The court responded to this assertion by stating:
We decline to accept the proposition that a qualified doctor
can so easily turn himself into a dupe. As indicated [before],
the [drug manufacturer's] warnings were there to read if he
would, and the dangers of the drug were.., also revealed in
other medical literature to which the doctor had access and
which he said he read.... The court below was correct in
134. Terzian, supra note 6, at 158.
135. Paul D. Colford, DTC Ads: Just what the Doctor Ordered, MEDIAWEEK, Oct. 20,
1997, at 46, 47.
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b.
137. See Holtz, supra note 2, at 214.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See Somora, supra note 1, at 212.
141. Direct-to-ConsumerAds: Influence Doctor's RXBehavior, AM. HEALTH LINE, Nov.
10, 1999.
142. 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971).
143. Id. at 218.
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not permitting him to take refuge behind the asserted liability
of the manufacturer.'"
When asked if he felt doctors were being pressured to prescribe drugs for
their patients merely because the patient asked for a drug advertised on
television, one physician simply stated, "It all depends on the doctor."'45
Critics of DTC drug advertising, and there are many, also argue that DTC
ads tend to mislead the consumer.'" Critics charge that television commercials
and other forms of advertisements are designed to sell and therefore are not
reliable sources of information. 47 These critics are concerned that the patient
will have misconceived notions of the drug's benefit and potential, and this
could lead to a further strain on the physician-patient relationship.' Patients
may begin to substitute advertising promises and misrepresentations for the
judgment of their physicians.
While this concern is valid, the FDA monitors these DTC drug
advertisements, 149 employs a staff that reviews them for misleading
information, 5' and is known to act swiffly on any advertisements that have
even a subtle tendency to mislead.' One example is a television commercial
where Schering-Plough "touted" the benefits of its product in slow and easy to
understand language but when the adverse effects to the drug were read by the
announcer, the commercial displayed a competing message that gave the
manufacturer's Internet site.' 52 The FDA quickly had Schering-Plough pull the
ad.
153
It is important to note that the FDA is a "science-based law enforcement
agency" designed to improve customer protection." Whether there are
problems with the way the FDA enforces its own regulations is beyond the
scope of this Comment. However, courts have recognized that it may be
beyond the realm of the courts' duties to hand down decisions that, either in
whole or in part, are motivated by a desire to make broad legislative-type
144. Id.
145. Interview with Kevin Griggs, M.D., Family Physician at Lexington Family Practice,
in Columbia, S.C. (Sept. 14,2000).
146. See Somora, supra note 140, at 211.
147. See id.
148. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 158.
149. See Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer Directed Broadcast Advertisements;
Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 (proposed Aug. 12, 1997); Okie, supra note 38, at Al.
150. See Okie, supra note 38, at Al.
151. See Somora, supra note 1, at 211.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See generally David A. Kessler, Remarks by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs
at the Association of Food and Drug Officials'Annual Conference, 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L. J.
773 (1991) (emphasizing the FDA's role as a science-based law enforcement agency).
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decisions.' 5 In Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.'56 the court addressed this issue
and stated, "The allocation of the duty to warn patients is a public policy
question involving the marketing system and economics of a major industry
and the everyday practice of an essential profession. We believe that the
Legislature is in a better position to allocate those duties."'157 In Haverly v.
United States 58 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed this
rationale by stating, "[i]t is not for the courts to quarrel with an agency's
rational allocation of its administrative resources."'59 Simply put, although
defining the scope of tort liability has traditionally been within the scope of the
judiciary," ° the notion that the judiciary oversteps its boundaries when it
encroaches on areas of law heavily regulated by the federal government is
probably more sound.
While there is some evidence that the physician-patient relationship may
be altered, the severity of this alteration remains, at best, unclear. A gap
appears when contrasting this unclear and seemingly slight interference with
the physician-patient relationship from DTC ads,'" with the more absolute
change of relationship in the recognized exceptions to the doctrine discussed
above.'62 The lack of a meaningful physician-patient relationship is more
evident in the recognized exceptions. Having to take more time to explain a
drug or to clear up a misconception about that drug seems to actually enhance,
rather than diminish, the physician's "role as an evaluator or decisionmaker."'63
Even if answering questions, however, diminishes examination and treatment
time," the dimunition still does not compare to the absolute lack of a
physician-patient relationship found in a mass-immunization setting.
Furthermore, DTC drug advertising does not give rise to a situation in which
the doctor assumes a passive role as is done in non-therapeutic settings. " The
physician still has the absolute duty to examine and advise the patient.'
Perhaps the best answer to this problem is simply to recognize that the
advertisements and their effects on the prescription consumer may be one
additional factor a doctor has to consider in his decisional calculus when
155. Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 358 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1984).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 874. But see Perez v.Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1254 (N.J. 1999)
(rejecting the notion that the court should await legislative action before ruling on the
applicability of the learned intermediary doctrine, which in New Jersey had been relegated to
statutory law).
158. 513 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1975).
159. Id. at 227.
160. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1254.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 139-53.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 80-129.
163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODucTLIABILITY § 6 cmt. b.
164. See Holtz, supra note 2, at 214.
165. See Perez v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1260 (N.J. 1999).
166. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 157.
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treating a patient. However, before coming to a conclusion on this issue, there
are several general policy issues that must be first considered.
C. Policy Considerations
The serious nature of the law regarding prescription drugs is obvious.
"Adverse drug reactions are a major cause of hospitalization, prolonged
hospital stays, and frequently death in the United States."'67 The availability of
prescription drugs is critical to public health, and public policy strongly favors
fostering a legal and social environment that encourages the continued
production and research of pharmaceutical products." The noted Dean Prosser
discussed this policy and stated:
'The argument that industries producing potentially
dangerous products should make good the harm, distribute it
by liability insurance, and add the cost to the price of the
product, encounters reason for pause, when we consider that
two of the greatest medical boons to the human race,
penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous side
effects, and that drug companies might well have been
deterred from producing and selling them.
' 169
The policy considerations behind the learned intermediary doctrine
discussed in Part III of this Comment are also clearly applicable in this section.
The importance of not discouraging pharmaceutical manufacturers from
research and production of useful products along with the risks and difficulties
of direct warnings to the prescription consumers clearly apply to this portion
of the analysis. However, at this point in the discussion, there are further
considerations that support the notion that DTC advertisements should not
create another exception to the learned intermediary doctrine.
DTC drug advertisements have various educational benefits. 70 One such
tangible benefit is that information about new treatments is easily distributed
to the general public.'7' Television commercials obviously reach an enormous
number of people, and the benefit of distributing information almost
instantaneously about a new drug that can improve millions of lives is
undeniable. Tied in with this benefit is the idea that information about
established treatments is also easily disseminated to millions. Commercials that
167. Holtz supra note 2, at 209 (footnote omitted).
168. See JOHNW.WADEET. AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES ANDMATERALS
ON TORTs 749 (9th ed. 1994) (quoting DEAN PROSSER, TORTS § 99, at 661 (4th ed. 1971))
(footnotes omitted).
169. Id.
170. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 156.
171. See Kathy L. Woodard, New Choices, New Responsibilities, BusiNEss FIRST-
COLUMBUS, June 23, 2000, at 4a.
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list various symptoms to an ailment may alert a viewer to a problem they did
not know existed.172 Recognizing warning signs to diseases like hypertension
or depression can alert a consumer at the early stages of an ailment.'
7
1
DTC drug commercials have also helped lift some social barriers to
problems that patients at one time hesitated to discuss with their doctors. One
doctor stated:
The biggest change I have seen stemming from these
commercials is the inquiries I have about Viagra. Impotency
was not a commonly discussed problem with my patients in
the past. Now, the most common conversation I have with my
patients that stems from a drug they saw on TV is a
conversation about Viagra.174
Prescription products for depression are also commonly advertised products.
Critics of DTC drug advertising cite the rising costs of prescriptions and
question whether it is appropriate for prescription prices to rise, partly because
pharmaceutical companies are spending more money each year on advertising
budgets.75 This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment except
to note that the FDA regulates the pharmaceutical industry,'76 and it is not for
courts to mandate industry regulation to the FDA implicitly through tort
decisions. If the FDA decides that the pharmaceutical industry should change
the way its products are marketed, it is the FDA's duty to take such appropriate
action. 177
V. CONCLUSION
The learned intermediary doctrine is a well-established legal doctrine and
should not be discarded simply because the governmental agency charged with
the protection of the prescription consumer saw fit to loosen its restrictions on
advertising. Exceptions to this doctrine have been narrowly construed and have
only been accepted in cases where there was a substantial change in the
physician-patient relationship. No clear, substantial change in this relationship
has evidenced itself as a result ofDTC drug advertising. Physicians are still the
final gatekeepers and there is not enough evidence to show that the keys have
been handed to the patients. Courts should approach this issue with the
172. See Terzian, supra note 6, at 156-57.
173. See id.
174. Interview with Kevin Griggs, M.D., Family Physician at Lexington Family Practice,
in Columbia, S.C. (Sept. 14,2000).
175. See Woodard, supra note 171, at 4a.
176. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988).
177. See id.
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recognition that DTC advertising is simply another factor in the physician's
decisional calculus in the treatment of the patient.
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